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Introduction 
In the dish·ict court and the opening brief, the dispositive issue was 
whether the near completion of the excavation of a foundation-coupled with 
the delivery and installation of geotextile fabric and engineered base material for 
a building's foundation-constitutes "commence1nent" of construction work 
under the Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute. As demonstrated in the opening brief, 
the case law is uniform in holding that such excavation and material delivery is 
cominencement. There is not a single case in any jurisdiction holding otherwise. 
Finding no legal support for the district court's ruling, the FDIC tries to 
change the subject. The FDIC does not address the district court's ruling until the 
end of its response brief, and cites no case holding what the district court ruled 
here-that near complete excavation does not constitute commencement as a 
matter of law. Instead, the FDIC asserts that various cases "suggest" a rule 
supporting its position and that the cases cited in the opening brief contain dicta 
or" suggestions." The FDIC' s assertions are a distraction. A court's application of 
a rule that" excavation equals commence1nent" to the facts of a particular case is 
not dicta. Moreover, labeling such language as "dicta" does not change the fact 
that no case supports the FDIC's position-even in dicta. 
In fact, the cases are so overwhelmingly in favor of Pen talon's position that 
it is worth pausing to examine the FDIC's argument. The FDIC asserts that-as a 
matter of law - a prudent lender inspecting a construction site cannot be on 
notice that lienable work is w1derway until excavation is complete. [Resp.Br. at 
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29-35.] Apart from makillg no sense given the visible nature of excavation work, 
the FDIC' s position that the "last spade" of work 1nust have been completed is 
contrary to the case law. The case law tethers the so-called "first spade rule" to 
the first- not the last- spade of dirt removed in excava tmg a building's 
foundation. H.B. Deal Con.str. Co. v. Labor Disc. Ctr., 418 S.W.2d 940, 951 (Mo. 
1967). It is difficult to understand how the "first spade rule" can be construed to 
suggest that the last spade of work must be cmnplete before a prudent lender 
would have notice that lienable work has begun. The FDIC never explains. 
This is perhaps why the FDIC changes the subject by discussing alternative 
grounds to affir1n. In discussing its alternative grounds, the FDIC 1nentions that 
it did not raise its arguments ill "precisely these terms" in the district court. 
[Resp.Br. at 2.] But the FDIC fails to mention that (i) it expressly stayed further 
briefing of the arguments in the district court, (ii) Pentalon therefore did not fully 
address any of those legal argu1nents, (iii) Pentalon therefore did not create a 
factual record to address the arguments, and (iv) the district court never had an 
opportunity to rule on those arguments. A party should not be pennitted to stay 
briefing of an argument ill the district court, thereby inducing the other party not 
to address the argmnent (legally and factually), and then raise the argument as 
an alternative ground to affinn th.at is "apparent from the record." Regardless, 
even on the underdeveloped record, all of the FDIC' s alternative arguments fail. 
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Although all of the FDIC' s arguments are off the mark, the FDIC, 
unfortunately, will still be successful on appeal. As it did in the district court, the 
FDIC will have succeeded in delaying the district court's consideration of the 
ultimate merits, even if this court reverses. As the response brief 1nakes clear, the 
ultimate merits will turn not on this court's interpretation of" cormnencement" 
under section 38-1-5 of the Utah Code but on the a1nbiguities surrounding the 
various contracts and guaranties among Pentalon, Ry1nark, and the lender. The 
longer that determination is delayed, the better for the FDIC. 
But more important, the FDIC has succeeded in raising the stakes of the 
litigation to the detriment of Pentalon. An attorney fees award to the prevailing 
party is in play in this case, and while the FDIC could afford to pay Pentalon' s 
attorney fees at the end of this case, given the extensive attorney fees the FDIC 
has incurred pursuing the "commencement" issue, at some point any chance of 
Pentalon's having to pay those fees will make the financial risk in vindicating its 
rights simply too great. Institutional parties- such as the FDIC and title 
insurers - can easily bear the delay and risk. 
Contractors and subcontractors working on the ground are far less able to 
bear the same delay and risk. To the extent this court agrees that the FDIC' s legal 
arguments are so lacking in merit that they have been advanced only for the 
purpose of delay, this court should award Pentalon the attorney fees on appeal 
under rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Response to the FDIC' s Course of Proceedings 
In light of the" alternative grounds" argument the FDIC raises, it is worth 
clarifying the course of the proceedings to clarify which argu1nents were fully 
briefed and sub1nitted to the district court. At the August 2011 hearing, only 
those raised in Granite's motion for partial summary judgn1ent concerning 
coID1nence1nent were briefed and argued. [R. R.349-408 (Granite's motion and 
me1norandum); R.1110-1197 (FDIC's opposition me1norandum to Granite's 
motion); R.1393-1595 (Granite's reply memorandum); R.1390 (notice to submit); 
R.1661 (notice of hearing); R.3733:3 ("[T]he only motion before the Court today is 
Granite's motion for partial summary judgn1ent."), attached as Addendum A.] 
In the opening brief, Pentalon referred to all plaintiffs as "Pentalon," and 
thus referred to the single 1notion adjudicated during the August 2011 hearing as 
"Pentalon's" summary judgment motion. [Op.Br. at 1, 6, 9, 10, 24, 29.] In light of 
the FDIC' s response, Pentalon clarifies that the only motion briefed and decided 
at the August 2011 hearing was the 1notion filed by Pentalon's co-plaintiff, 
Granite. [Id.] This reply refers to that motion as "Granite's," but otherwise 
continues to refer to the plaintiffs collectively as "Pentalon." 
Even though Granite's motion was the only 1notion decided at the hearing, 
five other summary judgment motions had been filed. [R.654-68 (Rymark 
Properties, LLC' s motion on Diversified Flooring, Inc.' s claims );68-127(Pentalon' s 
motion on lien priority);1198-1389(FDIC's motion on the Guaranty issue);1625-
1637(FDIC's motion on Pentalon's interest claim);1698-1818(Pentalon's cross-
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motion on interest claim).] But none of those motions were fully briefed and 
submitted for decision. In fact, they were all stayed by agreement of the parties 
pending further discovery. [R.3733:3-4;24.] 
This is important because, in the response brief, the FDIC raises arguments 
and cites to evidence .included .in motions that were stayed and never fully 
briefed. [See, e.g., Resp.Br. at 2-8,18,19,22,27-28 (material filed in support of 
FDIC's motion, R. 1198-1389; materials filed i11 opposition to Pentalon's motion, 
R.192-290;294-318;920-1109;1613-34.] Indeed, the fact section of the response brief 
is based almost entiiely on facts .included .in the FDIC' s motion for summary 
judgment and the FDIC' s opposition memoranda to Pentalon' s motion for partial 
summary judgment, neither of which was fully briefed and decided by the 
district court. [Resp.Br. at 2-8.] 
In support of its "alternative grounds" arguments, the FDIC asserts that 
the argu1nents presented in the FDIC' s motion for summary judgment were 
"preserved" for appeal. [Resp.Br. at 2.] What the FDIC fails to 1nention, however, 
is that its motion was stayed, never fully briefed, and never submitted for 
decision. To ask an appellate court to affinn on grounds that were never fully 
developed and to which the other parties did not respond is improper, at best. 
After Granite's motion was denied, the FDIC filed another summary 
judgment motion. But the FDIC' s subsequent motion neither renewed the 
promissory estoppel arguments raised .in the FDIC' s stayed motion for summary 
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judgment nor referenced any of the materials relied upon by the FDIC on appeal. 
[.R.2047-62.] The FDIC's abandonment of those arguments in its subsequent 
motion-which was fully briefed and decided- denied Pentalon an opportunity 
to put facts ir1 the record to counter the FDIC' s arguments. 
This court should keep the procedural posture of the record cites in the 
response brief in n1ind when resolving the question of whether the alternate 
grounds raised by the FDIC can be considered II apparent in the record," as that 
phrase is used in the case law describing alternative grounds. 
Argument 
I. The FDIC's Arguments that the Evidence Presented Was Insufficient as 
a Matter of Law to Establish Commencement Are Meritless 
In the opening briet Pentalon demonstrated that the liens of Pentalon, 
Granite, and Wimmer related back, as a matter of law, to the time those 
co1npanies began their work on the excavation of the foundation and took 
delivery of the n1aterials for the site to be used in the foundation. Under Utah 
law, such liens relate back to the time at which activities on the properly would 
put a reasonable lender on notice that lienable work was w1derway. Here, both 
the excavation activities and the delivery of materials were sufficient to put a 
reasonable lender on notice that lienable work was underway. [Op.Br. at 10-21.] 
Pentalon also demonstrated that, at the very least, there are disputed 
issues of material fact concerning whether the nearly cmnplete excavation and 
delivery of materials constituted cormnencement. [Op.Br. at 21-23.] Whether the 
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district court was incorrect at a matter of law, or incorrect because there exists 
disputed issues of 1naterial fact, this court should reverse. 
In support of its argmnents, Pentalon provided uniform case law from 
numerous jurisdictions demonstrating that the district court was incorrect in 
ruling that the near completion of excavation is not commencement. In response, 
the FDIC recognizes the overwhelming case law and buries its analysis of the 
commence1nent issue at the end of its brief. The FDIC asks this court to chart a 
new course based upon what it calls a JI suggestive" reading of a few cases and its 
labeling as JI dicta" the rule announced in a number of cases-i.e., excavation 
equals commence1nent. 
This reply first outlines the FDIC' s ru·guments and then responds to each 
of the1n. In short, nothing has changed since the opening brief. There still are no 
cases to support the district court's ruling that nearly complete excavation is not 
commencement as a matter of law. In fact, the opposite it true-nearly complete 
excavation is commencement as a matter of law. 
A. Pentalon's Work Was Sufficient to Establish Commencement as a 
Matter of Law 
The FDIC invites this court to hold that no prudent lender making a 
reasonable exa1nination of property could believe that work has commenced 
unless the excavation of a foundation is completely finished. [Resp.Br. at 32-33.] 
The FDIC' s approach is not supported by case law, misperceives the thrust of the 
commencement standard under Utah law, and is contrary to common sense. 
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None of the cases cited by the FDIC support its argu1nent that everything 
short of completed excavation of the foundation fails to establish conunence1nent 
as a 1natter of law. [Resp.Br. at 31-33.] 
• In Duckett v. Olsen, the Utah Supreme Court noted that consh·uction 
11 commenced August 4, 1980, by G & C Construction Co1npany, which 
excavated the base1nent and graded and filled the lot." 699 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supren1e Court did not indicate that the 
excavation was completed on that day, as iinplied by the FDIC. 
• In H.B . Deal, the Missouri Supre1ne Court observed that ongoing work 
on the excavation of a foundation was sufficient to impart notice to the 
world. 418 S.W.2d at 954 (noting if a bank's" officials had merely 
visually observed" such work was underway they would have notice of 
commence1nent) . 
• In Rupp v . Earl H. Cline & Sons, Inc., the Maryland Court of Appeals 
observed that "what the law means by the commencement of the 
building is some work or labor on the ground, such as beginning to dig 
the foundation." 188 A.2d 146, 149 (Md. 1963) (quotations omitted; 
emphasis added) . 
• And in Drilling Serv. Co. v . Baebler, the Missouri Supreme Court noted 
that work "commenced in May 1963" when the "excavation for all the 
buildings" was begun, and that this work entitled mechanics' liens to 
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priority over a mortgage recorded on September 13, 1963, even though 
the excavation may not have been completed until October 1963. 484 
S.W.2d 1, 8, 9 (Mo. 1972). 
Further, although the Minnesota and Kansas cases cited by the FDIC had 
fact patterns in which a mortgage was recorded after the excavation was 
completed, the cases make clear that conunencement is measured from the 
beginning-not the end-of this excavation work. 
• In Carr-Cullen Co. v. Deming, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that 
"the work of excavation begun by Anderson on September 7 was the 
first actual and visible beginning of improvements." 222 N.W. 507,507 
(Minn. 1928)) (emphasis added). 1 
• Similarly, in Kansas Mortg. Co. v. Weyerhaeuser, the Kansas Supreme 
Court noted that commencement "is some work or labor on the ground, 
such as beginning to dig the foundation, which everyone can readily see 
and recognize." 29 P. 153, 156 (Kan. 1892) (emphasis added). 
• And in Leidigh & Havens Lumber Co. v. Wyatt, the Kansas Supreme Court 
affirmed the priority of a mechanics' lien where the lien claimant 
11 c01nmenced the excavation of a basement" on October 13, 1938 but 
1 Carr-Cullen was cited in Brettsclmeider v. Wellman., 41 N.W.2d 255, 260 (Minn. 
1950), a case relied upon by the FDIC. [Resp.Br. at 33.] 
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mortgage was not executed until several days later. 109 P.2d 87, 91 
(Kan. 1941).2 
In light of the above, the FDIC' s assertions that the opening brief cites 
11 dicta" are curious. [Resp. Br. at 33-35.] The FDIC is inviting the court to set a 
course where no court has ever gone-even in dicta. [Id.] In contrast, the fact that 
Pen talon's argument is supported by the actual holdings of smne cases, the rule 
applied in other cases, and dicta in other cases, should provide the court cmnfort, 
not undermine its confidence. [Op.Br. at 11-18 & n.2) .] 
Even if the case law were a1nbiguous on this point-which it is not- the 
FDIC ignores the fact that the plu·ase "commencement to do work" is "construed 
in favor of lien claiinants." [Op.Br. at 11 (quoting Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 652 
P.2d 922,924 (Utah 1982).] According to the d ictionary, the term "commence" 
means II to have or make a beginning; start." In re Anderson, 275 B.R. 922, 926 
(B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 230 
(10th ed. 1993)). For this reason, the "corrunencement" of work standard is 
referred to as the II first spade rule" and tethered to II an actual beginning of 
improvement on the ground." Bob DeGeorge Assocs. v. Hawthorn Bank, 377 S.W.3d 
592, 599 (Mo. 2012); E.W Allen & Assocs. v. FDIC 776 F. Supp. 1504, 1509 (D. Utah 
1991). The FDIC's attempt to recast this standard as the "last spade rule" falls 
2 Weyerhaeuser and Leidigh were cited in Davis-Wellcome Mortgage Co. v. Long-
Bell Lumber Co., 336 P.2d 463,466 (Kan. 1959), a case relied upon by the FDIC. 
[Resp.Br. at 33.] 
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short of construing the term "commencement" in favor of Pentalon, as required 
under Utah law. 
The FDIC also ignores the fact that the lien statutes are remedial and 
construed to protect laborers and materialmen. See, e.g., Ketchum, Konket Banet( 
Nickel & Austin v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). In Calder, the Utah Supre1ne Court emphasized that" [t]he purpose of the 
mechanics' lien act is remedial in nature and seeks to provide protection to 
laborers and materialmen who have added directly to the value of the property 
of another by their materials or labor." Calder Bros., 652 P.2d at 924. The analysis 
turns on whether there is "visible evidence of work perfonned/' not whether any 
component of the work performed is c01nplete. Id. at 924 n.1. Under the FDIC's 
erroneous tl1eory, a lender could obtain summary judgment against a contractor or 
material supplier, notwithstanding evidence of visible work, as long as the 
lender could provide some evidence that the excavation of the foundation was 
not quite complete at the ti.me the lender recorded its deed. 
The FDIC also fails to acknowledge the type of examination a "prudent 
lender" must make prior to recording a trust deed. The FDIC asserts that a 
reasonable lender would have difficulty in distinguishing between (i) general 
excavation and the precision excavation of a foundation, (ii) native soils and 
foreign engineered structural base material, and (iii) "silt fences" used in 
landscaping and geotexti.le fabrics used in foundations. [Resp.Br. at 32-33;35-36.] 
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Apart from lacking any support, the FDIC' s assertions rest upon the incorrect 
assmnption that a c01nmercial lender acts with the requisite 11 pruden[ce]" based 
upon a layperson' s cursory assessment of whether foreign materials are on site 
or whether II excavation" is ongoing. [Id. at 32-33.] But the 11prudent lender" 
standard is not the II prudent neighbor" standard, as it requires lenders to 
exa:m.ine tl1e premises reasonably and diligently for signs that lienable work is 
underway. EDSNCloward, L.L.C. v. Klibanoff, 2005 UT App 367, ,r 22, 122 P.3d 
646; Calder, 652 P.2d at 924 ("inspection of the premises," not a cursory glance). 
Relatedly, the FDIC fails to explain why a reasonable lender would be any 
better off determining the exact 1n01nent when the excavation of a foundation 
was complete.3 If lender uncertainty attaches to any part of the process, this court 
should follow the legion of cases holding that excavation work is sufficient to 
establish commencement as a matter of law. [Op.Br. at 13-14.] 
Finally, even if the undisputed evidence that excavation was well 
underway were insufficient to establish commencement as a 1natter of law, there 
is a factual dispute that requires reversal. At a miniinum, Pentalon is entitled to a 
trial on the factual issue of whether the work here was sufficient to put a 
reasonable lender on notice that lienable work was underway. It is difficult to 
3 Even if this court accepts this argument, reversal is required. The evidence 
reveals that much of the excavation was complete when the FDIC recorded its 
deed and work on vertical construction had begun. [Op.Br. at 4,19-20&n.5.] If the 
reasonable examiner knows how to draw the liI1e between excavation work and 
vertical construction, as asserted by the FDIC, then the FDIC had notice that 
lienable work was underway here. 
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understand how th.e FDIC can assert that there is no factual dispute as to what a 
prudent lender conducting a reasonable examination would notice in light of the 
substantial work done here. [Resp.Br. at 31.] This court should reverse. 
Before turning to the delive1y of materials as an is1dependent basis for 
reversal, it is worth noting how the FDIC' s argument on appeal is undennined 
by its argument in the dish·ict court. In the district court, the FDIC emphasized 
that an issue of fact remained for trial even though the photographic evidence of 
excavation was undisputed. [R.3733:28 ("[T]here is a factual dispute about what 
a reasonable observer would conclude. And at that point, I think it is no longer a 
question of law . . . I think the FDIC is entitled to have a determination on the 
facts of what a reasonable person would think.") .] 
The FDIC highlighted the testimony of Pen talon's president that Pen talon 
"had not commenced consh·uction of any structure" at the time the FDIC 
recorded its deed, and asserted that this testimony "create[ d] a significant factual 
issue" that could only be resolved at trial. [R.3733:23.] The FDIC also argued this 
testimony created a factual dispute. [R.3733:25-26("[I]t becomes a factual issue 
when the president of the general contractor says-in his view, it wasn't 
construction .... I don't think he's saying that as a matter of law .. .. He's saying 
that as a matter of fact as a fact witness.") .]4 
4 On appeal, the FDIC now argues the opposite, and attempts to discredit 
Pen talon's attempt to offer the exact type of testimony the FDIC considered 
relevant in the district court. [Resp.Br. at 40.] 
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On appeat the FDIC asserts instead that determining what a reasonable 
lender might notice when examining the site is difficult because construction 
materials often look fairly silnilar. [Resp.Br. 31-33;35-36.] But any difficultly for a 
reasonable lender on those issues - which are a mirage, as demonstrated above-
only created a disputed issue of material fact as to whether a reasonable lender 
viewing the site here would have observed lien.able work. This fact question 
should be resolved by a jury, not at the summary judgment stage. This court 
should reverse based only upon the extensive excavation of the foundation that 
had occurred prior to the FDIC' s recording its deed. 
B. Pentalon's Delivery of Materials to the Project Site Was Sufficient 
to Establish Commencement as a Matter of Law 
In addition to excavation, the delivery of materials to the site constituted 
commence1nent. [Op.Br. 18-21.] In response to this point, the FDIC asserts that 
the delivery of materials is "rarely ... sufficient to signal the commencement of 
lien.able work" but does not provide any case law that supports this sweeping 
proposition. [Resp.Br. at 35.] 
The FDIC' s assertion ignores the plain language of the mechanics' lien 
statute, which provides that liens relate back to the actual "work" or the 
"furnishing of materials on the ground." Utah Code§ 38-1-5.5 Based on this plain 
5 Not all mechanics lien statutes feature this disjunctive test. For example, the 
Ohio statute iJ.1. force in 1929 and at issue in Becker v. Wilson, a case relied by the 
FDIC, required both commencement of work and subsequent delivery of 
1naterials in order for a materialmen' s lien to attach. [Resp.Br. at 36 (citing Becker 
v. Wilson, 165 N.E. 108, 109 (Ohio Ct. App. 1929) (requiring evidence of "a 
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language, Utah cases recognize that co1nmence1nent can be established either by 
"visible evidence of work performed,, or "the presence of building materials 
upon the land." Tripp v. Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(quoting Calder, 652 P.2d at 924 n .l). In fact the case relied upon by the FDIC 
states that delivery of materials, standing alone, can give rise to a 1nechanics' 
lien. [Resp.Br. at 35 n.12 (citing Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. Whitmore, 66 P. 779 
(Utah 1901) (affirming validity of a materialrnan's lien, even though lumber 
delivered to the property was "never actually used" to erect a building)).] 
Thus, in addition to the excavation work Pentalon completed prior to the 
date the FDIC recorded its deed, the delivery of 1naterials creates an issue of fact 
as to notice. Again, the cases cited by the FDIC support this proposition. In First 
Federal Savings & Loan v. Stewart Title Co., 732 S.W.2d 98, 101-02 (Tex. App. 1987), 
the Texas Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in favor of the lender 
because evidence of the delivery of materials to the site created a question of fact 
as to commencement. [Resp.Br. at 36.] The FDIC's arguments that some foreign 
materials are "indistinguishable" from native materials, and that some materials 
are "indistinguishable,, frmn those used for preparatory site work only 
underscores why a factfinder typically decides whether a reasonable lender 
would have had notice that lienable work was underway. [Resp.Br. at 35-36.] 
commencement of construction, excavation, and improve1nent upon the 
premises at the time of the initial deliveries of material")).] Of course, Becker is 
also distinguishable for the reasons noted in Pentalon' s opening brief- none of 
which the FDIC confronts in its brief. [Op.Br. at 16-17.] 
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The FDIC' s ability to imagine scenarios in. which there 1nay be smne 
confusion does not den1onsh·ate that it is entitled to smnmary judgment. This is 
especially true under the facts of this case, where the delivery of 1naterials-
coupled with the excavation work and vertical construction-was substantial 
and obvious enough to put a prudent lender on notice. Therefore, the mechanics' 
liens filed by Pentalon, the subconh·actors, and the 1naterial suppliers to relate 
back as a matter of law. [Op.Br. at 18-21.] This court should reverse. 
II. The District Court Erred in Striking Pentalon's Summary Judgment and 
Reconsideration Motions 
In its opening brief, Pentalon also argued that the dish·ict court erred in 
sh·iking the factual 1naterials that acco1npanied its opposition to the FDIC' s 
motion for surrunary judgment and in striking Pentalon' s motion for 
reconsideration. (Op.Br. at 23-29.]6 Pentalon raised these arguments on appeal 
only because they would be relevant to any determination of the ainount of an 
attorney fee award on re1nand. [Op.Br. at 23.] 
6 Contrary to the response brief, Pentalon has not argued that the district 
court abused its discretion in resolving its first motion for reconsideration. 
[Resp.Br. at 38-39.] Had the district court maintained its ruling that there was "a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether construction corrunenced," the 
parties would have been spared this appeal. [Op.Br. at 6 (citing R.1934-35).] 
Although the FDIC asserts the district court did not "obvious[ly] misread[]"H.B. 
Deal, the FDIC does not illuminate how that case could be read to support the 
FDIC' s position that commencement is impossible as a matter of law until 
excavation work is completed. (Resp.Br. at 39; H.B. Deal, 418 S.W.2d at 954 
(noting if a bank's II officials had merely visually observed" such excavation work 
was underway they would have had notice that lienable work was underway).] 
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TI1e FDIC' s atte1npt to defend the district court's decision to strike 
admissible evidence Pen talon filed alongside its opposition to the FDIC' s motion 
for summary judgment is exceedingly short. [Resp.Br. at 41 n.15.J In a fooh1ote, 
the FDIC defends the district court's decision to strike this evidence because it 
had already been presented in the objection Pentalon filed to the FDIC proposed 
order under rule 7(£)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Resp.Br. at 4ln.15.] 
But this is a concession, not a defense. 
The rule 7(£)(2) process is designed to allow the parties to bring a proposed 
order in" conformity with the court's decision." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(£)(2). Pen talon 
presented evidence alongside its rule 7(£)(2) objection because the FDIC' s 
proposed order went much further than the district court's denial of Granite's 
motion for su1nmary judgment on the basis that there was a "genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether construction commenced." [R.1934-35.] The FDIC 
instead inserted into an order a ruling that Pentalon's argument failed as a 
matter of law. [R.2041.] The district court ultimately disagreed with Pentalon's 
position and entered the order prepared by the FDIC. [R.2036-43.J Because the 
rule 7(£)(2) process does not provide parties with an opportunity to present new 
evidence, Pentalon had little choice but to present this evidence alongside its 
opposition to the FDIC's motion for summary judgment to make it part of the 
record. The district court's decision to strike this undisputedly admissible 
evidence was in error. 
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In addition, the district court's decision to sh·ike Pen talon's motion for 
reconsideration was also erroneous. First, this court's denial of Pen talon's 1notion 
for suIDinary reversal did not II decide[]" the question of whether the FDIC' s legal 
position is II clearly erroneous" for purposes of Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-
Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ,r 14,216 P.3d 352. [Resp.Br. at 39.] To the contrary, this 
court's order explicitly "deferred" the issues raised in Pen talon's motion. [ See 
Summary Disposition Order, attached as Addendum B.] Further, as set forth 
above, the merits arguments advanced at the end of the FDIC' s brief are 
c01npletely lacking in merit. [See supra Part I.] To the extent this court agrees that 
the FDIC' s legal argu1nents lack merit and have served only the purpose of 
delay, this court should award Pentalon the attorney fees it has incurred 
responding to the FDIC's frivolous arguments. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
Second, reconsideration was requiTed under the "new evidence" prong. 
The expert report and evidence included with the motion did not iinproperly 
usurp the court's role, as the FDIC asserts. [Resp.Br. at 40.] As a case cited by the 
FDIC makes clear, "(a]lthough an expert's opinion may embrace[] an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact, the issue embraced 1nust be a factual one." 
Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1353 (6th Cir. 1994) (cited on page 40 of the 
FDIC' s brief). In its brief, the FDIC concedes that the question of what a 
reasonable examiner would have been on notice of is a" question of fact." 
18 
[Resp.Br. at 29.]7 Pentalon's expert evidence therefore was both new and 
relevant. 
The evidence of the materials Pentalon delivered to the site was equally 
new and relevant, and should have been considered, not stricken, by the district 
court. As noted above, the fact that some of the evidence was included in an 
objection filed pursuant to rule 7(£)(2) does not mean it was already in the record 
as evidence. And the fact that the evidence of various materials could have been 
culled from a photograph attached to the cmnplaint or other deposition 
testimony does not defeat the district court's obligation to consider the evidence 
when ruling on both the parties' cross motions for surmnary judgment and 
Pen talon's subsequent motion for reconsideration. 
III. This Court Should Not Address the FDIC's Proposed Alternate Grounds 
to Affirm 
Perhaps in light of the lack of legal support for the district court's 
commencement ruling, the FDIC changes the subject to what it calls alternative 
grounds to affirm. But the FDIC 1nisapprehends the limited nature of the 
alternate grounds doctrine and ignores its burden on summary judgment to 
7 The FDIC did not object to Pentalon's testimony on this basis below. To the 
contrary, the FDIC invited the district court to conclude that such opinion 
testimony was highly relevant to the fact question of what a reasonable examiner 
would have noticed. [R.3733:23(noting that the testimony of Pen talon's president 
"create[d] a significant factual issue" that could only be resolved at trial);3733:25-
26(emphasizing the propriety of relying of such tesmnony).] 
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construe evidence in the light most favorable to Pen talon. As set forth below, 
neither of the alternate grounds advanced by the FDIC succeed. 
A. The FDIC Misapprehends the Scope of the Alternate Grounds for 
Affirmance Doctrine 
The alternate grounds doctrine applies only in "limited circumstance[s]" 
and allows an appellate court to affirm "where the alternate ground is apparent 
on the record." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ,r 20, 52 P.3d 1158. To be apparent on 
the record requires "more than 1nere assumption or absence of evidence conh·ary 
to the 'new' ground or theory." Francis v. State, Utah Div. ofWildlife Res., 2010 UT 
62, ,r 19,248 P.3d 44. Rather, an appellate court can affirm on an alternate gTound 
only if the record "contain[ s] sufficient and uncontroverted evidence supporting 
the ground or theory to place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the 
prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal." Id. The doctrine is limited in this 
maimer for the precise purpose of preventing a prevailing party from 
"selectively focus[ing] on issues below" while reserving for appeal other issues 
"that the opposition had neither notice of nor an opportunity to address." Id. 
The alternate grounds doctrine is of particularly limited application where 
the appellee is asking an appellate court to affirm a grant of summary judgment 
on a factually intensive ground that the appellant never had the opportunity to 
confront below. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1316 (5th Cir. 1997) (in 
the summary judgment context, alternate grounds offered on appeal "must at 
least have been proposed or asserted in [the district court] by the movant"); 
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Andersen v. Chrysler Corp., 99 F.3d 846, 855 n.5 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The only 
prerequisite to our affirming [summary judginent] on such an alternative ground 
is that the non-moving party had an opportunity in the district court to submit 
affidavits or other evidence and to contest the issue.") . 
In the summary judginent context an appellee seekin.g to rely on an 
alternate ground must therefore show both that the ground is "apparent in the 
record" and that the record is "materially the same" as the" one that would have 
been developed had the prevailing party raised the alternative basis for 
affirmance below." Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State, 20 P.3d 180, 195-96 (Or. 
2001) ("[E]ven if the record contains evidence sufficient to support an alternative 
basis for affirmance, if the losing party might have created a different record 
below had the prevailing party raised that issue, and that record could affect the 
disposition of the issue, then we will not consider the alternative basis for 
affirmance."). Neither of the FDIC' s alternative grounds satisfy this standard. 
B. The FDIC's New "At the Instance of the Owner" Argument 
Cannot Serve as an Alternate Ground for Affirming the District 
Court's Judgment 
The FDIC concedes that it never argued below that Pen talon's work was 
not performed "at the instance of the owner" as required under Utah Code 
section 38-1-3. [Resp.Br. at 2,21-22.] Had the FDIC presented this argument, 
Pentalon would have developed a record that included all of the evidence to 
support the proposition that it began (and nearly finished) excavating the 
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foundation of the project" at the instance of the owner" in May 2008. This court 
should reject FDIC's "instance of the owner" argument on this ground alone. 
The FDIC' s argument fails on the merits as well, even on the incomplete 
record. Pen talon's work in May 2008 was "at the instance of the owner" as 
required by Utah Code section 38-1-3. The evidence is that Rymark directed 
Pen.talon to expedite the commence1nent of project and that Pen.talon a.greed to 
accmrunodate this request. [R.998("The owners were very anxious to get this 
project started and were pushing us to start at the earliest possible date we 
could.");id. ("They gave us the direction to proceed");1412 (noting Pen.talon 
expedited the project to accommodate Rymark).J This evidence is sufficient to 
foreclose su1mnary judgm.ent in favor of the FDIC on this new theory. 
The FDIC next asserts that the above evidence can be disregarded as a 
1natter of law based on the language of the contract between Pen.talon and 
Rymark. [Resp.Br. 18-19;23-25;1223.J Even if there were authority for this 
assertion, it is contrary to both Utah law on oral modifications and the smnmary 
judgment standard. Under Utah law, parties may "modify a written agreement 
through verbal negotiations subsequent to entering into the initial written 
agreement, even if the agreement being modified unambiguously indicates that any 
modifications must be in. writing." R. T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, ,r 13 n.4, 40 
P.3d 1119 (emphasis added) (citing cases). 
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It" is the well-recognized rule that notwithstanding recitals in a prior 
contract restricting changes or 1nodi£ication il-i its terms, the parties are as free in 
appropriate circumstances to renegotiate new tern1s or to make separate 
supple1nental agreements as they were to make the contract in the first place." 
Prince v. R. C. Tolman Constr. Co., 610 P.2d 1267, 1269 (Utah 1980); see also 
Createrra, Inc. v. Sundial, LC, 2013 UT App 141, ,-r 12,304 P.3d 104. In this regard, 
Utah law comports with the common law, which allows parties to alter their 
agreements " [e]ven where the contract specifically states that no non-written 
modification will be recognized." R. T. Nielson., 2002 UT 11, ,-r 13 n.4 (citing 2 
Corbin on Contracts§ 7.14 at 404 (1995)). The FDIC's assertion that it is 
"inescapable" that Pentalon breached its contract with the owner as a 1natter of 
law by agreeing to accelerate commencement is simply not supported by Utah 
law. [Resp.Br. at 19.] 
A number of other factual issues also foreclose this court from affirming 
the district court's grant of sum1nary judgment on the FDIC' s newly proffered 
alternate ground. First, the issue of whether an oral agreement exists presents an 
issue of fact. See, e.g., Cabaness v. Thom.as, 2010 UT 23, i-f 56, 232 P.3d 486; O'Hara v. 
Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah 1981). Second, whether a particular breach is 
material presents an issue of fact. Wilson v. Johnson, 2010 UT App 137, ,-r 25, 234 
P.3d 1156. Third, whether a contract is abandoned, or whether strict compliance 
with a particular term has been waived, presents a question of fact, or at 
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miniinmn, a mixed question of fact and law which requires a dish·ict court to 
make factual findings. Watkins v. Ford, 2013 UT 31, if 20, 304 P.3d 841; U.S. RealhJ 
86 Assocs. v . SecurihJ Inv., Ltd., 2002 UT 14, ,r 11, 40 P.3d 586. 
The FDIC asks this court to resolve all of the above issues in its favor as a 
matter of law. But this court's role is not to 1nake such findings, especially on an 
iI1complete record such as the present. See, e.g., Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979) ("[I]t is not the function of an appellate court to make findings 
of fact."). 
The FDIC' s heavy reliance on In re Corbin Park, L.P., 470 B.R. 573 (B.A.P. 
10th Cir. 2012) is 1nisplaced for the same reason. [Resp.Br. at 19-20; 23-24.] Unlike 
the present case, Corbin was not resolved on a motion for smrunary judgment. 
The bankruptcy judge in Corbin held a five-day evidentiary hearing and 
examined thousands of pages of evidence before making a factual fiI1ding that 
the lien claimant had not performed lienable work during the period before the 
lender recorded the mortgage. Corbin, 470 B.R. at 582-86. The bankruptcy judge 
in Corbin also had the opportunity to judge the credibility of the lien claimant's 
assertion that he had been given a "verbal notice to proceed" by the owner 
before determining that the evidence weighed iI1 favor of a findiI1g that no such 
verbal authorization had been given. Id. at 585-86.8 
8 A trial was necessary in Corbin to resolve this issue because Kansas law -
like Utah law-allows the terms of a written contract to be modified by "words 
acts, or conduct" even if the contract contains a provision that requires 
modifications to be in writing. Saddlewood Downs, L.L.C. v. Holland Corp., 99 P.3d 
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On post-trial appeal, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in Corbin was 
presented with the question of whether any of the bankruptcy judge's post-trial 
findings were "clearly erroneous," not whether the lender was entitled to 
judginent as a matter of law. Id. at 579-80. The Panel upheld each of the 
bankruptcy judge's firtdings, emphasizing that "the important and frequently 
decisive role of fact fix1din.g is cmrunitted to the trial court, not this Court." 
Corbin, 470 B.R. at 593. The FDIC's assertion that Corbin presented "virtually the 
same question the Court faces here" is therefore simply not true. [Resp.Br. at 19.] 
If anything, Corbin stands for the proposition that this court 1nay not reach out 
and decide the many factual issues raised by the FDIC' s never-before articulated 
alternate ground for affirmance. 470 B.R. at 593. 
Finally, the FDIC' s implication that Pen talon violated Ogden City code by 
commencing its work prior to obtaining a building permit is not supported by 
the record. [Resp.Br. at 18.] As the FDIC knows, Pentalon obtained authorization 
from South Ogden City to begin working on the excavation of the project's 
foundations prior to the issuance of the building pennit. [R.1001; R.1420; 1482; 
1572-73.] And Pentalon also informed Rymark that this work was authorized by 
South Ogden City. [R.1002] 9 This evidence - especially when construed in the 
640, 646 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004). And like Utah, under Kansas law, "whether a term 
of a written contract has been modified or waived by a subsequent agreement is 
a question of fact for the trial court." Id. 
9 The FDIC' s argument rests on an incorrect assumption that 
"commencement" under South Ogden City Code section 9-1-2 is the same as 
"commencement" under Utah Code section 38-1-5. For building code purposes, a 
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light most favorable to Pentalon-further augurs in favor of a finding that 
Pentalon1 s work in May 2008 was "at the :instance of the owner" as required by 
Utah Code section 38-1-3.10 The FDIC's request that this court grant summary 
judgment on this issue is inappropriate because even the inc01nplete record 
project is not conunenced w1til concrete is poured, presu1nably because the 
excavation needs to be inspected by the City before it is covered in concrete. 
[R.1016;1573.] For mechanics' lien purposes, by contrast, a project is commenced 
as soon as a reasonable examiner has notice that it is underway. [Op.Br. at 10-21.] 
10 Even if the FDIC had evidence that Pentalon violated the South Ogden City 
Code, that evidence would be :irrelevant to the "instance of the owner" question 
and corn1nencement question presented on appeal. See, e.g., Kessler v. Mandel, 40 
A.2d 926, 927 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1945). Kessler notes that even if "appellant did 
violate the city ordinance by proceeding with the alterations or repair work for 
which the mechanic's lien was filed, without a pennit, that did not invalidate the 
mechanic's lien or give the association any right to question its priority or 
validity." Id.; see also Mani Elec. Contractors v . Kioutas, 611 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993); Gellis v. B.L.I. Constr. Co., 251 S.E.2d 800, 812 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978). 
The FDIC' s reliance on In re Renaissance Hosp. Grand Prairie Inc., 713 F.3d 285 
(5th Cir. 2013), is misplaced. (FDIC Br at 18.] The lien claimant there stipulated 
that it had not provided materials or labor before the date at issue. Renaissance, 
713 F.3d at 295. In light of this stipulation, the Fifth Circuit conducted only a 
limited review of whether other evidence was sufficient to overcome "the sh·ong 
presumption created by its stipulation," and held that it could not, in part 
because no building permit had been obtained. Id. at 297. In addition, and unlike 
here, the undisputed evidence in Renaissance revealed that a permit was required 
to perfonn the work at issue. Id. 
The FDIC' s other case, Hopper Res., Inc. v . Webster, 878 N.E.2d 418 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2007), is similarly inapposite. [Resp.Br. at 18.] Hopper was an appeal from a 
trial in which the parties presented evidence that a building permit was required. 
878 N.E.2d at 421, 422-23. The building permit evidence was relevant because the 
lien claimant had procured the building pennit fraudulently. Id. Against this 
backdrop, the appellate court refused to vacate a finding that this wrongdoing 
barred the lien claimant fro1n foreclosing its lien. Id. Unlike Hopper, there are no 
findings here, and there is no evidence that Pentalon engaged in fraud in the 
work it performed on behalf of Rymark. Rather, the evidence in this case is that 
South Ogden City specifically authorized Pentalon to proceed with excavation 
work without a permit. [R.1001;1420;1482;1572-73.J 
For all of the above reasons, the district court correctly observed that the 
permit issue raised by the FDIC below was :irrelevant in this case. [R.3733:39.] 
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raises genuine disputes of material fact as to whether Pen talon's work was 
performed " at the instance of" Rymark. 
C. The FDIC' s Promissory Estoppel Argument Similarly Cannot 
Serve as an Alternate Ground for Affirmance 
The FDIC does not claim that its promissory estoppel argun1ent is 
"apparent in the record." [Resp.Br. at 25-29.J Presumably, this is because it 
believes the issue as "preserved." [Resp.Br. at 2.J But to preserve an issue for 
appeal, a party must present it "to the trial court in such a way that the trial court 
has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 
72, ,r 51, 99 P.3d 801. To be sure, the FDIC filed a motion for sumn1ary judginent 
below, raising an "equitable estoppel" argument. [Resp.Br. at 2 (citing R.1216-
17).] But the district court never had any" opportunity to rule" on this motion 
because it was never submitted to the court for decision. [R.3733:2-4.J 
Indeed, because discovery relevant to this motion was still in progress at 
the time of the district court's hearing on the c01nmencement issue now on 
appeal, Pentalon has not even had the opportunity to file an opposition brief to 
the arguments FDIC now claims are "preserved" for this court's review. 
[R.3733:3-4;24.] It is difficult to imagine an alternate ground could be" apparent" 
on such an incomplete record, and the FDIC' s promissory estoppel argument can 
be rejected on this ground alone. 
The FDIC' s argu1nent also fails when the facts that are in the record are 
viewed in the light most favorable to Pentalon. The FDIC does not cite any cases 
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that support the proposition that it is entitled to summary judgment on its 
promissory estoppel defense. [Resp.Br. at 25-29 (citing Peterson Mech., Inc. v. 
Nereson, 466 N.W.2d 568,571 (N.D. 1991) (reviewing whether the district court's 
findings of fact as to estoppel were clearly erroneous on appeal from a bench 
h·ial); Hopper Res., Inc. v. Webster, 878 N.E.2d at 422-23 (sa1ne); In re S. Bay 
Expressway, L.P., Bankr. Nos. 10-04516-All, 10-04518, 2010 WL 4688213 (S.D. Cal. 
Nov. 10, 2010) (resolving the issue of equitable estoppel after taking three days' 
worth of testi1nony)).] 
After all, the crux of an estoppel claim is reasonable reliarice, a 1natter 
generally left to the finder of fact. See, e.g., Anderson v. Larry H. Miller Commc'ns 
Corp., 2012 UT App 196, ,r 20-21, 284 P.3d 674; Youngblood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
2007 UT 28, ,r 38, 158 P.3d 1088. Further, under Utah law," a party claiming an 
estoppel carn1.ot rely on representations or acts if they are conh·ary to his 
knowledge of the truth or if he had the means by which with reasonable 
diligence he could ascertain the truth." Youngblood, 2007 UT 28, ,r 33. 
The key issues of the FDIC' s reasonable reliance and reasonable diligence 
cannot be resolved by this court as a 1natter of law on the present record. First, 
the FDIC cannot demonstrate that it relied on promises made in the Construction 
Contract as a 1natter of law because the record reveals the FDIC had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the Notice of Commencement Pentalon undisputedly 
filed on May 5, 2008. [R.923.] 
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Second, there are also disputes of material fact regarding each of the 
"broken promises" the FDIC alleges on appeal. [Resp.Br. at 27-28.] There is 
evidence that the time frames set forth in the Construction Contract were 
modified by the parties. [R.998;1412.] As to the Guaranty, the full phrase quoted 
by the FDIC reads: "except for Related Documents, the Project will be 
consh·ucted and completed free and clear of all liens and encumbrances." 
[R.1312.] The "Related Documents," in turn, make clear that mechanics' and 
materiahnen' s liens were "permitted," and provided a mechanism for the lender 
to obtain releases of such liens. (R.1308(defining "Permitted Liens" as including 
"liens of materialmen, mechanics, warehousen1en, or carriers, or other like liens 
arising in the ordinary course of business");1301(providing a mechanism for the 
lender to waive its priority).] And contrary to the FDIC's assertion, the record 
also demonstrates that a lender does not always take a" first-lien place." 
[Resp.Br. at 27-28;R.1289(noting that finance companies do not always insist on 
"first-lien place");1300(noting that the FDIC' s desire to have a 1'valid perfected 
first lien" was subject to exceptions). 
Third, the FDIC' s cavalier assertion that Pen talon's hands " lack the 
requisite cleanliness" as a matter of law to be entitled to be paid for its work is 
not supported by the evidence. [Resp.Br. at 29.] The limited record on appeal 
reveals that Pentalon began work on the project in May 2008 at the repeated 
behest of Rymark, filed a notice of commencement before it began excavation, 
29 
obta:ined South Ogden City approval to work on the excavation prior to 
obta:in:ing a build:ing permit, informed Rymark of the City's authorization to 
commence work, and worked openly and diligently on the project (and :in full 
view of Ryrn.ark, which also ran a business on the adjacent parcel). Although 
Pen talon's hands may have been dirty fron'l digg:ing foundations for Ry1nark in 
May 2008, its hands were certainly not unclean :in any legal sense. The FDIC' s 
attempt to invoke this equitable doctrine as an alternate ground for affirming 
summary judgment should be squarely rejected.11 
As set forth above, both of the FDIC' s alternate grounds are procedurally 
improper and completely lack:ing :in merit, even on the :inco1nplete record before 
this court. To the extent this court agrees that the FDIC' s alternate grounds 
argu1nents serve only the purpose of delay and rais:ing the stakes of this 
litigation, this court should award Pen.talon the attorney fees it has :incurred 
respond:ing to the FDIC's frivolous argu1nents on appeal. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). 
Conclusion 
Based on the forego:ing, this court should reverse the district court's denial 
of Granite's motion for surrunary judgment. 
11 Both of the FDIC' s alternative grounds only apply to Pen talon. They do not 
apply to the other subcontractors, such as Granite and Wimmer, who were not 
parties to the contracts at issue. See Utah Code§ 38-1-29 (lien claimant's lien 
rights may only be waived if the lien claimant gives written consent). 
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Schofield for Barnes Bank. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. I did have a chance 
to read the briefs, and, Mr. Degraffenried, I appreciate the 
courtesy copies that you sent to us. That always helps. 
Let me - before we get started and to make sure 
I've got - I know what we are dealing with, rather than what 
we're not dealing with, and I think I know the answers, but I 
just want to - one of the things that was so confusing or 
hard for me to deal with was when I got the files, there are 
all kinds of motions in there, and a lot of them haven't done 
a notice to submit. So I don't know if they just died on the 
vine or if we're just waiting for other things to happen on 
the case, but let me just take just a second and go through 
what I have in here. I have defendant Rymark's motion for 
summary judgment against Diversified Flooring, which was 
filed back in December of '09. There's been no reply, no 
notice to submit, and I know you parties aren't involved in 
that, but it's in the file. I've also got Pentalon's motion 
for partial summary judgment. It was filed in November of 
'09, and there was an opposition filed by FDIC on November 
20 th • Then there was the supplemental memorandum filed by 
Pentalon in June of 2011, but no notice to submit. Then I've 
go t FDIC's motion for partial summary judgment, which was 
filed on April 28 th , but I don't have any response to that 
and no notice to submit yet. Then I've got plaintiff 
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P~ntalon and Granite Construction's cross motion for partial 
summary judgment dealing with the interest and the mechanics 
lien claim that was filed on August the 4 th , 2011, but no 
response, no notice to submit. I don't know if you know 
anything about any of those or . . . 
MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, the only motion before 
the Court today is Grani.te' s motion for partial summary 
judgment. The one that's been -
Court? 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ROBINSON: - submi t ted for decision. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: And maybe I can clarify for the 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: There was - there are some 
motions that plaintiffs made, both in Pentalon and Granite, 
back in 2009. Then when the FDIC took over the bank -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: - we had a long period of a 
stay. And then after the stay, we talked to counsel and 
decided that we had actually done a 56(f) opposition in our 
original opposition bef ore the FDIC took over anµ we -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: - we determined there was some 
additional discovery that we needed to conduct. We have now 
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- on our end, we have re - we are - we have fully briefed our 
motion for summary judgment. We are waiting for their 
opposition to our cross motion -
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: - against Pentalon, and we're 
finishing some discovery. We've been cooperating on some 
discovery and some other issues that they're going to finish 
in order to get their final opposition and final reply, and 
then we'll do up a final reply, and I think that's about 
where we'll be at that point -
MR. SCHOFIELD: And I would agree. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: - in determining those other 
motions . 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, - and I'm not being 
critical, but it was just - what made it hard is I knew there 
was a motion out there. But initially, it was like, well, 
which motion are we dealing with? And I thought I'd better 
make sure which ones are up, and, you know, sometimes motions 
get lost in the shuffle. And if I don't get a notice to 
submit, it doesn't trigger anything. So -
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: I think this is -
THE COURT: - that's why the courtesy copies always 
help too, because the - everything - just the originals just 
go in the file, and we don't know about them. And then I 
just - one of your greatest fears is that you didn't address 
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an issue or a motion that was in the fi l e. So 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: Yeah. I think at this point, 
it's accurate to say. The only ones submitted to the court 
thus far is this particular motion -
THE COURT: Okay. So 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: - for partial summary judgment. 
THE COURT: - we're just dealing with Granite 
Construction's motion for partial summary j udgment, right? 
MR. ROBINSON: That's corr ect. 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, I appreciate 
the clarification, and then, like I say, I got your courte sy 
copies, and that was helpful too. 
I have also - I've had a chance to read all the 
briefs on this. So I feel like I under stand what the issue 
i s, but, I guess where it's Granite Construction's motion, 
Mr. Degraffenried, if you want to make an argument, I'd be 
glad to hear the -
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: - argument. 
MR. DEGRAFFENRIED: Again, thank you, Your Honor. 
And as I'm sure you're aware, the issue before the Court as 
to this motion is whether the mechanics lien that Granite 
Construction filed enjoys priority over the subject trust 
deed. Now, the operative date in this matter is May 28 th of 
2008. That's the date the trust deed was recorded in the 
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it's a particularly simple case. I think the decision - and, 
frankly, the legislature finally has changed the statute, 
just not in time to help the Court in this matter. I think 
the decision is a complex decision. What really had 
happened? How much was site work? At what point did site 
work become construction of a structure? I think that's a 
difficult question. When the plain - when the - Pentalon, 
the general contractor's own president says, "We hadn't 
commenced construction of a structure," I think that says, 
Your Honor, there's a significant factual dispute that merits 
this matter being presented at trial. 
We ask the Court to deny the motion. Let us 
13 conclude all the discovery, which is outstanding, and 
14 · ultimately we'll be back here either with more motions if 
15 they - if the discovery warrants or for trial on these 
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issues. That would be our request, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Schofield, can I ask you, though -
as you look at this motion, is there a dispute of facts? I 
mean, -
MR. SCHOFIELD: Well, -
THE COURT: - that's really the key to motions for 
summary judgment, but I - is - what is the dispute of fact if 
there is any? 
MR. SCHOFIELD: Well, I think the disputed fact is 
not what was done on what date, because I think counsel has 
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Pentalon Construction, Inc., et al, ) 
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) Case No. 20130973-CA 
V, ) 
) 
Rymark Properties, LLC, Federal Deposit ) 
Insurance Co., et al, ) 
) 
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) 
This matter is before the court on Pentalon Construction, Inc. And Granite 
Construction Company's molion·for summary reversal. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for summary disposition is denied, 
and a ruling on the issues raised therein is deferred pending plenary presentation and 
consideration of the appeal. See Utah R. App. P. lO(f). TI1e appeal shall proceed to the 
next proi:edural stage. 
DATED this ~ay of December, 2013. 
FOR TI-IE COURT: 
